On China's web, networked actors ranging from state agencies to private internet users engage in highly active online discourse. Yet as diverse as this discourse may be, political content remains highly regulated, particularly on issues that affect the legitimacy of the
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It can indeed be helpful to call such processes of meaning-making 'collective remembering', particularly considering how members of a community appropriate and internalize shared narrative scripts in ways that at times 'feel' like individual memory. 'What matters', as Guibernau (2004: 135) explains, 'is not chronological or factual history but sentient or felt history'. Nevertheless, 'memory' remains a metaphor. Nations are not persons, and they do not 'remember' like individuals do. Suggesting otherwise risks conflating knowledge of the past and acts of remembering, as is the case in discussions that describe e.g. the lack of knowledge in China about the 1989 Tiananmen Protests as a form of 'amnesia' (Lim 2014) . Other authors insist that delegating certain activities, such as writing one's tax returns, constitutes an act of 'outsourcing memory' (Bowker 2005: 257) . Such interpretations play fast and loose with the idea of 'remembering'. What such accounts are actually describing, are acts of manipulating information and shaping knowledge, and I find framing the debate in terms of 'mnemonics' ultimately unhelpful for exploring how these processes work. In fact, claims about how nations 'remember' or 'forget', how they have been 'traumatized' or suffer 'amnesia', are themselves discursive moves that deploy the metaphor of personal memory in order to configure historical scripts for political purposes (cf. Wertsch 2002: 553) .
A crucial aspect of the nation is thus its discourse of the past, and this discourse is mediated largely through modern mass communication technologies like print, radio, or television (Anderson 2006: 135-140; Billig 2009: ch.5 ). These one-to-many communication channels have traditionally perpetuated a sense of national community through their use of 9 standardized languages and recognisable symbols, regardless of the precise ideological statements that the individual outlets communicated (Gellner 1983 (Gellner /2006 . It is thus in no small part the shared experiences with a mediated past that lend the nation its cohesive power. Nation-ness is built into modern mass media.
In China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has embraced the power of mass media early-on and has more recently designing its approach to culture and media governance around the idea of 'public opinion guidance', a concept that creatively fuses Leninist political communication principles and selective media liberalization (Tsang 2009 ).
This approach entails extensive censorship and propaganda efforts alongside collaboration with private actors, and it has been studied in areas such as news media (Stockmann 2013) and broadcasting (cf. my own work in Schneider 2016) . It is often argued that the internet challenges this cultural governance approach and empowers contentious users against the Party and state (e.g. Chan & Bi 2009) , and yet the leadership seems fairly effective at retaining its 'guidance' of political discourse across digital realms, whether through its innovative digital censorship system (Deibert et al. 2010: 449-87) or through new forms of propaganda such as 'astroturfing' (i.e. using paid commentators to covertly influence online discussion; cf. Han 2013) .
In light of these developments, it seems sensible to ask what role digital media play in the kind of processes that authors like Anderson, Billig, or Gellner have outlined and that East Asia scholars have examined for the case of China. If technologies have particular uses built into them through their designs and arrangements (cf. Winner 1980: 125) , then what happens, for example, to the history of the nation in that vast repository of human expression that is the web?
2 Do the interfaces and algorithms of China's web 'programme' a particular kind of discourse about the past?
Searching for the Nanjing Massacre Online
In societies that have embraced advanced ICT, digital information has become so ubiquitous that it is frequently overwhelming. In 2015, China's webspace encompassed over four million websites with more than two hundred billion individual webpages (CNNIC 2016: 9-12 ). To find anything in such an ocean of data, it needs to be filtered so users can retrieve only the information they need. The technology that today achieves this feat is the search engine. Search engines have become the 'switchboards of the internet generation' (Halavais 2009 (Halavais : 1160 . They are one of the most important windows through which we access information on the web. Yet search engines are by no means neutral windows onto the web.
As König and Rasch (2014: 13) point out:
Search engines function as gatekeepers, channelling information by exclusion and inclusion as well as hierarchization. Their algorithms determine what part of the web we get to see and their omnipresence fundamentally shapes our thinking and access to the world.
Search algorithms distort how knowledge works, raising the question as to how particular digital discourses are prefiltered by search engines, for instance in China. Just like other sectors of China's media ecology, the search engine environment is heavily managed by the Chinese state, which aims to keep foreign services at bay while simultaneously promoting carefully monitored domestic alternatives (Shirky 2015: 290) . One implication of this strategy is that foreign ICT firms may face sanctions if they do not conform to government requirements like making user data available to the authorities. With regards to search engines, Google avoided this dilemma when it left the PRC market in 2010, ostensibly as a reaction to hacking attempts and censorship issues (Drummond 2010) , but likely also because the Californian company found the Chinese market with its home-grown services harder to crack than it had anticipated. Google now offers its Chinese-language services through its Hong-Kong-based URL, but mainland China is effectively a Google-free zone.
Instead, users are offered a number of local search engine alternatives (Jiang 2014 Chinese search term 'Nanjing Massacre' (Nanjing datusha 南京大屠杀), using an anonymous 'research browser' (Rogers 2013: 111) and Beijing-based IP addresses (exceptions were the Google queries, for which I simulated the searches from a Hong-Kongbased computer). I have reproduced the search results in the coloured chart in Figure 1 below. Two findings are particularly worth pointing out: the generally strong 'own-content bias' and specifically the high rankings of online encyclopaedias (or baike 百科) affiliated with the search engines. all queries, the search engine never once listed another encyclopaedia. Interestingly, the only true outlier to these patters was Google, which listed affiliated services only two percent of the time and actually listed more Baidu than Google content.
These findings have important implications: they suggest that users of specific search engines experience the web through very narrow lenses that privilege the contents of the search engine provider and that prevent serendipitous exposure to varied knowledge sources.
While users have the option to compare search results across different mainland engines, my own interviews with digital media scholars and practitioners in China (2013 China ( -2015 suggests that users rarely go to such troubles, particularly when specific search engines are already installed as the default of their browsers (e.g. Good Search for Qihoo's browser).
Online Encyclopaedic Knowledge on the Nanjing Massacre
One of the core resources that search engines point their users towards, are China's Wikipedia-like online encyclopaedias. Scholars of knowledge archives have shown how encyclopaedias can serve as powerful filters of knowledge; they are highly political, for instance by serving implicit conservative or progressive goals through the information they create and the ways they relay it (O'Sullivan 2011). Does it then matter that Chinese search engines prominently direct users to the Nanjing Massacre entries in their in-house encyclopaedias? With each of the mainland Chinese search providers maintaining its own baike, one might expect considerable variation of historical discourses, depending on the search engine that was used to query the topic.
In terms of their knowledge production, the mainland encyclopaedias pride themselves on promoting values that are generally similar to those adopted by Wikipedia, emphasising for example 'verifiability' and 'objectivity'. They also are nominally 'usergenerated', though it is worth keeping in mind that the editorial models differ (cf. Figure 2 ):
whereas Wikipedia relies on openly accessible debates between amateur editors without professional oversight, the mainland encyclopaedias draw their materials from user input but vet these contributions through professional editors, generally in ways that are not open to public scrutiny. They are thus designed to reproduce the logic of traditional publishing with its preference for coherent professional work over potentially inconsistent amateur contents.
To explore whether these differences in design and editorial practices affect the history discourse on the Nanjing Massacre, I have placed the entries of five Chineselanguage encyclopaedias next to one another and have compared their structure, style of representation, main arguments, and digital features. Indeed, the differences are stark, at least between the Chinese-language Wikipedia entry and its PRC alternatives. Figure 2 shows some of the key features of the encyclopaedias and their entries. Such a finding is striking, since it calls into question the self-proclaimed values of the Chinese corporations that produce such encyclopaedic entries. The sites proclaim their commitment to originality, yet they are comfortable claiming copyright for entries that are based on extensive plagiarism. This occurs on encyclopaedic sites that all opt to combine user-generated content by registered writers with professional editorial oversight, and yet this added layer of supervision does not appear to affect the degree of duplication that characterizes the content. an 'explanation by the Japanese sides' (Rifang bianjie 日方辩解). It reads: '"The Nanjing
Massacre absolutely does not exist, all of these were regular casualties of war" -this has for many years been the explanation that Japan's rightists provide for the atrocities that the invading Japanese troops committed during the Nanjing Massacre' (all translations are mine).
Later sections go into greater detail about 'the Japanese side', yet these sections are similarly one-sided: controversies within Japan about such minority views are ignored or are presented in ways that leave readers with the impression that Japanese society must be dominated by 
Digital Depositories of the Past
When mainland online encyclopaedias showcase or reference historical materials, they frequently draw these from dedicated history websites. To establish how such websites present this historic event, and how they make use of the interactive potential of the web (cf. demand that all Japanese be killed in retribution for the massacre.
It is noteworthy that these inflammatory racial defamations are not deleted by the authorities or the website providers, despite the effectiveness of the PRC's censorship system (cf. Deibert et al. 2010: 449-487 ). In the case of the website Tiexue, many of the most aggressive statements are in fact sanctioned by a virtual red 'stamp' that marks comments as particularly 'popular replies' (remen huifu 热门回复), based on the number of 'likes' they received from other users. I have reproduced one such instance in Figure 3 . This comment to a post on Tiexue about rape during the Nanjing occupation suggests that anyone killing a Japanese person should receive 1000 RMB, and it concludes with the words 'kill kill kill …'.
While this is an exceptionally crude comment (not all comments are aggressively racist), it was ranked highest by 'likes'. The 'popular response' stamp is visible in the top right corner.
Interactive algorithmic mechanisms thus create the impression that racist outrage is indeed an appropriate or even praiseworthy response to the event. There are also website sections that promote mutual respect between China and Japan, for instance Japanese peace delegations visiting Nanjing, and likewise the comment sections also contain conciliatory remarks, yet such sentiments are comparatively rare and seem marginalized by the more chauvinistic statements that design choices and algorithmic factors 'push' to the fore. what is true or false about the past and how to feel about this. In other words, the Nanjing Massacre discourse on China's web treats the past as a shrine rather than as a forum for discussion. Its use of the web's technological affordances reflects this, and this is also visible in the resulting network structures.
Hyperlink Infrastructures of National Humiliation
The technical and editorial choices of web editors also affect how information on the Nanjing
Massacre is structured on the web. This becomes apparent when mapping out the part of The Nanjing Massacre web discourse is thus embedded in an online space that is dominated by state and Party actors. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the policy choices that the state and its ruling Party make (e.g. decreeing who can authoritatively present content online and shutting down websites that offend official guidelines), though such governance practices certainly play an important role in structuring China's online spaces. That said, the present hyperlink study draws attention to two additional factors that shape web discourses: the design and content choices that web editors make (e.g. when to link to other web sources) and the way that the technology of the web works (e.g. rewarding sources that receive many references with ever more references). The in-built 'hypermediality' of the web can thus be reconfigured to resemble the traditional mass-media networks that the CCP prefers for its political communication efforts, and these recalibrated web networks lend themselves to the unified, national historiography that I have discussed here.
Conclusion
This article has examined an important national history discourse on China's web: the Nanjing Massacre. Tracing the discourse through China's search engines, online encyclopaedias, major websites, and hyperlink networks, this study finds that the Nanjing Massacre's history resides within a national media ecology dominated by sources that relay a singular, definitive narrative on the issue while discouraging interaction, ambiguity, and serendipity. This creates a particular 'media logic' (Chadwick 2013 ) that starts with China's search engines and extends to mainland online encyclopaedic entries, which generally eschew the kind of 'see-for-yourself' culture that user-generated content could potentially facilitate (Benkler 2006: 218) . This logic further shapes the archival practices of large web repositories, with their digitized official content and lack of user interaction, and it is visible in the way the Nanjing Massacre's hyperlink networks are structured to create a hierarchical info-web, dominated by state and Party institutions. Throughout these networks, web editors and writers deploy pathos to frame accounts of the past, disambiguating the historical narrative by driving its morale home in overlapping modes of communication (textually, visually, and acoustically). The web resources leave little doubt as to how particular elements of the historical accounts should correctly be 'felt', and the default mode is a sense of deeprooted humiliation and righteous anger.
In short, as far as the Nanjing Massacre discourse is concerned, China's web provides a framework for making sense of the past as a national shrine rather than a forum, bringing it in line with official narratives. This is not to say that the online discourse is solely chauvinistic. While official media support patriotic sentiments, Chinese leaders are also wary of radical nationalism (Gries et al. 2016: 177) , and websites associated with the Party or state at times indeed showcase conciliation rather than humiliation, for instance when depicting
Sino-Japanese cases of cultural exchange. In such moments, history starts to resemble a
forum. Yet even where websites describe transnational exchanges at eye-level, they do not engage in them through the web's potential to create discussion. Voices from outside China are rare and only appear either in support of the domestic consensus or as targets of righteous vitriol. Comment sections are either disabled or provide users with spaces to comment in ways that are rarely interactive, and that are overall shaped by the same emotive scripts that also inform nationalist discourse more generally.
It may seem unsurprising that a politically sensitive web discourse in China remains relatively homogenous. After all Chinese media are traditionally under close Party and state scrutiny, and China's authorities have long integrated media discourses into their 'patriotic education campaign', which intentionally flattens the complexities of the past (Wang 2012; Callahan 2010 ). However, the web's 'hypermediality' (Bolter & Grusin 2000) could potentially encourage the kind of serendipity that would counter efforts to homogenize discourses. And yet, in the case of China's web, the technical affordances of the medium have become arranged to facilitate the kind of media logic that the CCP prefers, which is a traditional mass-media logic. The present, media-centric study suggests that this outcome has as much to do with technical and design elements built into China's web as with regulatory choices aimed at preserving the CCP's mass-media rationale. This interaction between technology and politics lends itself to the shrine-like representation of history on which nationalism relies, in China or elsewhere. Authors like Anderson and Gellner suggest that nation-ness may be built into mass media. In the Chinese case, the CCP's efforts to calibrate
China's web in line with its own interests assure that nationalism is also built into digital media.
What we are left with is the uncomfortable impression that an important piece of modern Chinese historiography is constructed on the PRC's web in ways that do not do justice to the complexity of the human past. Future studies will need to explore whether similar processes are at work in other national webs, e.g. in Japan, and how these findings compare to practices in often vibrant social media spheres, which I have not examined here.
Recent research suggests that Sino-Japanese discourse in China's social media is characterized by highly diverse discussions (Feng & Yuan 2014) . As research on history and memory suggests, no single actor 'owns' a discourse once that discourse is opened to such discussion (Evans 2003: 12) : 'Historians may be hard at work redesigning the past, however, but so too are politicians, painters, novelists, sculptors, movie-makers, television producers, textbook writers, teachers, museum directors and a whole host of other people, and what comes out as the end result may not be quite what any of them intended'.
Despite this caveat, I would contend that even where the meaning of the nation is up for debate, its nature rarely is. Nationalism is a form of consciousness that creates meaning by prompting members of the nation to see the world through the lens of communities that are imagined as politically and culturally cohesive. As Billig (2009: 55) has argued, the resulting worldviews do not separate into distinct positive 'civic' vs negative 'chauvinistic'
attitudes -a distinction that is itself often ideological. The core of nationalism remains an imagined sense of group attachment, and all groups are constructed around 'some features that make them special and, in a certain way, "superior" to the rest' (Guibernau 2004: 137) .
For national communities, a unified historiography is precisely such a feature.
It is with these considerations in mind that we should re-evaluate the potential of digital media to redefine or even unhinge feelings of nation-ness. This study suggests that as far as the web is concerned, digital media do not necessarily challenge the rationale of traditional media, but can extend them to reproduce nationalism in similar ways. Digital networks, with their propensity to lock users into like-minded sub-networks (Pierson 2014) , are ideal allies to established mass communication channels, particularly in a country like China where the political leadership tries to recalibrate digital networks under the banner of 'national sovereignty'. Indeed, the PRC's media and cultural governance approach under Xi
Jinping has heavily focused on bringing all media, traditional or new, in line with the Party's preferred media logic, and within this logic, digital media become well suited for the kind of comfort-zone maintenance on which nationalism relies.
In the end, the potential of certain digital media configurations to inspire myopic views and feelings does not bode well for disputes such as those over modern East Asia's history. As long as such disputes are framed through nationalism, they remain anchored in false dichotomies (e.g. us vs them), attribution errors (e.g. to what exactly feelings like loyalty or hatred should be attached), and dogmatic commitment to specific narrative accounts (e.g. victimization or heroic superiority). These dimensions of imagined communities are ultimately inimical to the prospect of meaningful historical reconciliation.
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